# wiki completeness theorem

. The term "complete" is also used without qualification, with differing meanings depending on the context, mostly referring to the property of semantical validity. y . is true by construction. {\displaystyle E_{h-1}} Clearly, D m {\displaystyle \Psi } {\displaystyle (\forall k)({a_{1}^{n}}...{a_{k}^{n}})<(n-1)m+2} . Φ {\displaystyle D_{n}} ψ . . ( ( can be derived. ) . . + ( n ) Any of the several well-known equivalent axiomatizations will do. should be true of the naturals , , which is equivalent to it; thus 1 {\displaystyle \Psi } a syntax-based, machine-manageable proof system) of the predicate calculus: logical axioms and rules of inference. 2 Φ ϕ ¬ . , . a . ϕ model for the negation) of any formula $A$ that is not-deducible in the Gentzen formal system without cut-rule. Every strongly complete system is also refutation-complete. D 1 Under such conditions every formula of the form k {\displaystyle (T)(\rho \wedge \rho ')} to be true in general; in the latter we take it to be false in general. 1 y When there is an uncountably infinite collection of formulas, the Axiom of Choice (or at least some weak form of it) is needed. . . + ). u ) x 1 x z is provable. The term "complete" is also used without qualification, with differing meanings depending on the context, mostly referring to the property of semantical … k {\displaystyle a^{n}} . It follows now that we need only prove Theorem 2 for formulas φ in normal form. ϕ On the other hand, suppose that ψ Its "last arguments" are z2,z3...zm+1, and for every possible combination of k of these variables there is some j so that they appear as "first arguments" in Bj. ∀ . ′ ¬ If Theorem 1 holds, and φ is not satisfiable in any structure, then ¬φ is valid in all structures and therefore provable, thus φ is refutable and Theorem 2 holds. ∧ , If on the other hand Theorem 2 holds and φ is valid in all structures, then ¬φ is not satisfiable in any structure and therefore refutable; then ¬¬φ is provable and then so is φ, thus Theorem 1 holds. ′ where (P) is the remainder of the prefix of . ∨ ) x . . ′ For example, Gödel's completeness theorem establishes semantic completeness for first-order logic. {\displaystyle (\forall u)(\exists v)(P)\psi (x,y|x',y')} The proof of Gödel's completeness theorem given by Kurt Gödel in his doctoral dissertation of 1929 (and a shorter version of the proof, published as an article in 1930, titled "The completeness of the axioms of the functional calculus of logic" (in German)) is not easy to read today; it uses concepts and formalisms that are no longer used and terminology that is often obscure. . ρ x {\displaystyle D_{n}} 1 b 1 A formal system is complete with respect to tautologousness or "semantically complete" when all its tautologies are theorems, whereas a formal system is "sound" when all theorems are tautologies (that is, they are semantically valid formulas: formulas that are true under every interpretation of the language of the system that is consistent with the rules of the system). ϕ